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Rejoinder 
George Casella and Roger Berger 
We thank Professors Dickey, Good, Hinkley, Morris, Pratt and Vardeman 
for their thoughtful and insightful comments. We also thank Professors 
Berger and Sellke for kindling our interest in this problem. 
Before responding to specific points raised by the discussants, we 
would first like to make some general comments that will, perhaps, make our 
own beliefs clearer. To some extent we agree with a frequentist colleague 
of ours who said, upon seeing the title of our paper, "Why worry about 
reconciliation? There is nothing frequentist about a p-value." We essen-
tially agree that there is nothing frequentist about a p-value, but are 
concerned, as are Berger and Sellke, that there are a great many 
statistically-naive users who are interpreting p-values as probabilities of 
Type I error or probabilities that Ho is true. The thesis of Berger and 
Sellke (B&S) is that these users are grossly wrong in the two-sided case. 
However, the two-sided case, to us, carries along with it many built-in 
problems, and we considered what seemed to be a more straightforward 
problem to see if there really were gross deficiencies with p-values. 
The two-sided case suffers from a certain lack of symmetry that 
necessitates treating the two hypotheses differently. In particular, the 
present B&S methodology fixes mass on the null and varies it on the alter-
native. This is dictated somewhat by the different geometry of H0 and H1 , 
but the end result is that there is no way to treat the hypotheses 
equitably. Therefore, even priors that strive to treat H0 and H1 in the 
same way must contain some subjective input. Of course, even the fre-
uentist model, and hence the p-value, may be based on subjective input, 
but it is only sporting to look for a Bayesian set-up that is as impartial 
(sorry Professor Vardeman) as possible. The one-sided case presents us 
with such a set-up. 
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We agree with Professor Good that p-values and Bayes factors (or 
posterior probabilities of ao> are here to stay. This is one reason why we 
undertook this study of the relationship between p(x) and infP(ao lx): We 
wanted to see whether the phenomenon described by B&S in the two-sided 
problem, namely the infP(H0 lx) is much greater than p(x), also occurs in 
the one-sided problem. We tried to precisely define conditions under which 
we could show that the B&S concept of irreconcilibility did not hold. Under 
fairly general conditions in the location parameter model (see Theorem 3.4) 
we could show that 
infP(ao 1 x) ~ p(x), 
and therefore the phenomenon of irreconcilibility, in general, does not 
occur in the one-sided testing problem. This leads us to believe that the 
above mentioned problems with the two-sided set-up may be the cause for the 
discrepancy between the p-value and P(H0 lx). 
Reply to Dickey 
We find Professor Dickey accusing us of supporting the thesis of B&S, 
citing Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 (which show that p(x) ~ P(H0 lx) for all priors 
in the case considered.) However, our main point is that the p-value is on 
the boundary of the posterior probabilities, showing that the B&S 
phenomenon does not necessarily occur in the one-sided case. To further 
support our thesis of reconcilability, we go on to show that 
infP(~ lx) < p(x) in many cases, so there is a proper prior for which 
evidence is reconciled. 
It is unclear whether Lindley's comment dissuaded Dickey from his 
interest in p-values, but we feel that there is merit in the concept of the 
p-value as a quick albeit crude form of inference. This is in the spirit 
of our closing comment that, "interpretations of one school of thought can 
have meaning within the other." 
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Reply to Good 
Professor Good suggests certain interesting parametric classes of 
priors for the normal mean problem, doing calculations mainly in terms of 
Bayes factors instead of posterior probabilities. He shows that for a 
special case of his priors (X0 • X1 • 0, a0 • a 1 = ~. P(H0 ) = P(H1 ) • t), 
that reconciliation is possible for ~Ia large. But this special case just 
n 
defines a n(0,~2) prior, so Good's computation with ~/a large is a special 
n 
case of our computation with a~ in Theorem 3.3. Good, however, does not 
see this as reconciliation, differentiating between the evidence against 
H0 :a ~ 0 and H2 :a = 0. This distinction is tangential to the main point, 
however, since the p-value is always taken as the maximum of P(X>xla), the 
maximum being taken over all a in H0 • Therefore, the p-value is the same 
for both H0 and H2 , so although H0 is not H2 , we have not exaggerated to 
obtain reconciliation. 
Reply to Hinkley 
The comments of Professor Hinkley offer a number of general ideas 
about the testing problem, only some of which we agree with. Firstly, we 
agree that the p-value is unambiguously objective, but we do not consider 
it an error rate. It is precisely for this reason that the p-value has 
come under so much attack from Bayesians (as Jim Berger is quick to point 
out, E(p(X)IH0 is rejected)= tJ,/2). A p-value, at best, is a summary of 
the evidence against H0 given the data. We agree that is hopeless to 
calibrate p-values to posterior probabilities, but we were not calibrating. 
We view p(x) and P(H0 lx) as two interesting and seemingly related measures 
of statistical evidence. However, since they are based on different sets 
of assumptions, a general attempt at calibration is doomed to fail. 
We agree with Hinkley's comment that p-values provide one convenient 
way to put useful measures on a standard scale, and that the operational 
interpretation should be relative to the information contained in the data. 
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This concern is also expressed by Good, who proposes standardizing p-values 
to sample sizes of 100. Although we agree that sample size is important in 
the interpretation of p-values, we presently do not endorse these or other 
attempts at calibration. In fact, we find ourselves very much in agreement 
with Hinkley's statement concerning confidence ranges, and would probably 
go much further. In a large majority of problems (especially location 
problems) hypothesis testing is inappropriate: Set up the confidence 
interval and be done with it! 
Reply to Morris 
The concerns expressed by Professor Morris share similarities to those 
of Hinkley and Good, and his simple example proves to be very helpful not 
only in understanding the relationship between p(x) and P(~ lx), but also 
in understanding the essential differences between the one-sided and two-
sided problems. The fact that Morris' equations (1) and (2) describe 
opposite behavior to that of B&S's equation (1.1) is very illuminating, and 
shows the large effect that a prior point mass can have. 
The election example points out the need for reporting the sample size 
along with the p-value. A good frequentist would always report the 
probabilities of both Type I and Type II error, and Morris shows us that 
reporting the sample size along with the p-value is somewhat equivalent to 
this, and we thoroughly agree with him. His example also illustrates 
another of our major concerns about the over-use of hypothesis testing: 
Setting up the 95% confidence intervals provides an unambiguous choice 
between (a), (b) and (c). 
Morris' calculations further illustrate that the ratio of u/t is an 
important factor in determining whether reconciliation obtains. Our re-
sults formalize the way in which reconciliation obtains as the prior infor-
mation becomes vague with respect to the sample evidence. If the prior 
information is sharp, the Bayesian and frequentist measures will certainly 
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disagree. This does not make our result irrelevant, however, since we do 
not say that these measures should agree in all circumstances. Further-
more, in situations with sharp prior information, we would want the 
measures to disagree, with the relevant measure being chosen according to 
one's statistical preference. 
Reply to Vardeman 
The comments of Professor Vardeman perhaps most closely reflect our 
own views, and part of our article was an attempt to quantify Vardeman's 
comment that "anything is possible". We too find the "spike at 90 " dis-
tressing, and are perhaps more comfortable with a cost structure. 
The p-value switch from t=1.4 to t>1.4 has also been a source of con-
cern for us, because there is no firm frequentist reasoning on which it is 
based. It no doubt is mimicking the calculation for an a-level, but does 
not have the same theoretical basis that the a-level calculation has. 
Furthermore, this tail calculation gives obvious bias against ~, and, for 
that reason, is not interpretable as an error rate. However, with appro-
priate attention to sample size, the p-value is still valid as a measure of 
evidence against H0 • 
Reply to Pratt 
Saving the best for last, we now turn to Professor Pratt, or in the 
words of the Beatles, "Mean Mr. Mustard." Pratt believes that the results 
in our paper, besides being rather specialized and not very useful, have 
already been done by him. Obviously we disagree. 
Our main point was that in the one-sided problem the p-value does not 
necessarily overstate the evidence against H0 in the sense that the p-value 
lies within or on the boundary of a range of reasonable posterior 
probabilities. Thus, an inequality like infP(~ I x) ~ p(x) is not "useless" 
but, in fact, proves our point. 
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The simple location model, while admittedly being specialized, is 
useful for at least two reasons. Firstly, consideration of a simple model 
can help us gain some understanding about the behavior of these evidence 
measures; the simple model keeps technical difficulties from masking 
behaviour. Secondly, the location model, even the normal model with known 
variance, can provide good approximations to more complicated cases. Many 
others have considered the location model to be deserving of attention, in 
particular Pratt(1965, p. 182-183) considers this model. 
It is not at all clear what was obvious to Pratt in 1965, and perhaps 
more was obvious to him than to any reader of his paper. In the location 
model, Pratt stated, 'if the prior distribution of 9 becomes "diffuse", 
then T-9 and T become independent also, and the p-value becomes exactly the 
conditional probability that 9 ~ 0 given T.' No further explanation or 
proof of this statement is given, so let us look at it more closely and see 
some "obvious" implications. First, as Hinkley points out, the p-value is 
completely objective and does not depend on the prior. So as the prior be-
comes diffuse the p-value doesn't change at all! Perhaps Pratt meant that 
as the prior becomes diffuse, the posterior probability approaches the 
p-value. But then what is meant by the phrase "becomes diffuse?" In 
Theorem 3.4, a~ corresponds to the prior becoming diffuse, and we see that 
P(H0 !x) can converge to any number between 0 and 1 depending on the values 
- + of g(O) and g(O ). Therefore, no convergence of P(H0 lx) to p(x) need take 
place. 
In his discussion, Pratt qualifies his 1965 statement by eliminating 
"jagged" priors from consideration. If we interpret jagged to mean dis-
continuous, then Theorem 3.4 not only points out that only a discontinuity 
at zero matters but also quantifies the effect of such a discontinuity. In 
short, Theorem 3.4 gives precise and simple conditions under which the 
convergence of P(H0 lx) to p(x) will occur. 
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We believe that there is more value in precise, stylized but verifi-
able statements than in broad but vague statements that are open to many 
interpretations, some of which are wrong. This is not to say that 
intuition is bad, but only that intuition should be backed up by precise 
theorems. The work of Pratt (1965) is important, with many far-reaching 
implications - the fact that we are still discussing it twenty years after 
publication is proof of that. However, our work is not contained in Pratt 
(1965), but rather is, at the least, an extension and formalization of some 
ideas contained therein. 
SUMMARY 
Bayesians and frequentists may never agree on the appropriate way to 
analyze data and interpret results, but there is no reason why they can't 
learn from one another. Whether or not measures of evidence can be recon-
ciled is probably a minor consideration, understanding what affects a 
measure of evidence is a major consideration. Some key factors were 
identified in these papers, more in the discussions. Our goal in writing 
our paper was to better understand the similarities and differences between 
p-values and posterior probabilities. With the help of B&S and the dis-
cussants we feel that we have succeeded. We hope that the reader has too. 
